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ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: 
SAVE THE PLANET OR LET IT BURN?
CBA in Environmental Policy
• Cost-benefit tools increasingly used in policy analysis (in 
UK Green Book, BRE)
• General observations but with illustrations based on 
“Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change”
• Professor Nick Stern
– Professor of Economics in London
– Chief Economist & Senior VP at World Bank
– Head of HM Government Economic Service
– FBA etc. etc. ... and very clever guy
• Published by HM Treasury October 2006, high profile
• “The Stern Report should be seen across the 
globe as the final word on why the world must 
act now to limit the damage we are doing to our 
planet” (Tony Blair, 2006)
• … but mixed reception from informed readership
• Serious and influential piece of work on an 
important topic – deserves scrutiny
• Which are economic questions, which aren’t.
What did the Stern team do?
• Global focus. Makes particular (a) scientific and 
(b) economic assumptions, then cranks 
numbers.
• Result: Effort now to stabilise CO2 at 550ppm 
would be highly cost-effective (increase NPV)
• But important distributional issues - within
(Bangladesh vs. NZ) and across generations
Conceptual steps …
• How do we get at a NPV of policy and 
draw Stern-type conclusions?
? Step 1: Generate climate-adjusted GDP 
time series (include non-market benefits)
? Step 2: Turn that into utility time series
? Step 3: Turn utility time series into NPV
Step 1 …
• Uses an ‘IAM’ called PAGE-2002 to 
predict adjusted GDP time series with and 
without climate change
• Anthony - show me on a single slide what 
Stern says GW will do to the planet if 
unabated
5%-95% confidence range of impacts
But in terms of levels (Newberry) ...
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• Suddenly – in terms of GDP flows - the 
‘worst case’ (95%) scenario doesn’t look 
so bad.
• But still not sufficient for drawing policy 
conclusions - welfare
• Let’s move to Step 2 …
Turning £ into ‘utility’
• PAGE-2002 maps emissions paths into 
GDP paths (including non-market costs 
and benefits)
• Stern (and debate in general) emphasises 
uncertainty in the science
• Translating GDP into utility seems difficult, 
fraught with uncertainty … right?
Wrong !
• Utility function is
U = log £
• Not necessarily a bad utility function – lack of sensitivity 
analysis (in original) major omission
• Implies equity weights that many don’t like – puts too 
much weight on rich: question of taste. 
• Rule of thumb: if you double income you halve the 
welfare impact of a given financial burden
Step 3: Discounting
• Rate at which we trade off current and future -
low discount rate, higher weight on the future
• Private firms use ‘market rate’. In policy design 
there are good reasons not to.
• Choice critical in current setting because of long 
time horizons. Graphs above went to 2200 - $1m 
discounted at say 9% becomes …
• …. $0.006
Nordhaus (2007)
• “…the Review’s radical revisions arise 
because of an extreme assumption about 
discounting.”
• NZ Treasury says use 10% in its ‘Primer 
on CBA’ - though it acknowledges diversity 
and problems in LR
• So what is the ‘right’ discount rate?
Getting economists to agree isn’t easy ... 
(Weitzman, AER 2001)
• Weitzman argues dispersion makes the case for 
hyperbolic discounting (Green Book)
• As a minimum there is lots of doubt and credible 
policy analysis needs to be aware of that – lack 
of sensitivity analysis again.
• But let’s think about Stern’s choices …
Time for a little Greek …
Social discount rate = δ + ηg
• δ ‘pure rate of time preference’, η ‘income elasticity of 
marginal utility’, growth rate of per capita consumption
• Stern uses δ = 0.1; η = 1; g = 1.3 → r = 1.4
• Lower than normally used – and note ‘industry’ view
• Higher discount rate reduces appeal of climate policy
So what if we used a higher rate?
• Weitzman (2007) reckons that over a long 
horizon “most economists would settle for a “trio 
of two’s”, that is δ = 2, η = 2; g = 2”.
• This gives an r = 6%. Do the math on that and 
the evaluation of damage done in 2100 is 100 
times smaller than that in Stern.
• So what’s going on? Are economists saying we 
shouldn’t give a damn about future generations? 
Ethics of η
• Stern: global per capita income will grow at 1.3% per 
year → in 2006 $ will rise from $8k now to $94k in 2200.
• So future climatic damages will come out of a much 
higher level of income (remember earlier chart).
• Stern’s high-damage case generates a 14% decline in 
consumption in 2200 so per capita consumption would 
grow from $8k today to only $81k in 2200. 
• QUESTION: How much should we sacrifice now to 
improve situation of later generations?
Answer … ?
• This is an ethical question around inter-
generational equity, not an economic one.
• Answer is about societal taste, not expert 
judgement
• Utility function embodies (as η) a particular 
ethical view – one to which you may or may not 
subscribe.
Dasgupta (2007)
Are the numbers taken in the Review to reflect the two 
ethical parameters compelling?
I have little problem with the figure of 0.1 for δ – though 
many economists would.
The figure adopted for η, the ethical parameter reflecting 
inequality in human well-being, is deeply unsatisfactory. 
To assume that η=1 is to say that the distribution of well-
being among people doesn't matter much - we should 
spend huge amounts for later generations even if they 
are expected to be much better off than us.
Ethics and the Decision Criterion
• Conclusion from Stern is based on NPV: NPV 
raised, but also redistributes poor to rich.
• Another ethical stance: each generation should 
leave at least as much total societal capital 
(tangible, natural, technological) as it inherited.
• Another: Rawlsian - maximize the well-being of 
the poorest generation.
• Which is “right”? Taste – not expertise.
What of intra-generational ethics?
• Distribution of impact within may drive taste for dramatic 
action - GW will hit Bangladesh, Africa etc hardest 
• One way to ‘help’ is to manipulate global climate but 
there are other more direct, and perhaps much cheaper, 
things to do: reduce disease impact (sanitation 
programs), crop vulnerability (diversification)
• “The problem is poverty, not climate” (Newsweek 2007)
• Mixture of abatement vs. adaptation needs more thought
Policy Instruments
• Stern: face carbon users with “price”
• Tax vs. permits equivalent in terms of behaviour 
– though not distribution – good reasons for 
preferring tax
• “My ambition is to build a global carbon market, 
founded on the EU Emissions Trading Scheme 
and centred in London” (Gordon Brown, 12 
March 2007)
What price a tonne of CO2?
• Tol/OECD (2005) meta-analysis – “unlikely 
to exceed 15 USD”
• Pearce (2003) meta-analysis – 2 to 15
• Nordhaus/DICE – 4
• ETS Futures – 15 to 20
• NZ proposals (15 NZD) – 10
• Stern – 85 USD: very much an outlier
Evaluation
• Stern has raised profile of CBA of climate 
change policy – big contribution
• Stern CBA has “issues”
• But this isn’t (a) to deny global warming nor, (b), 
to say nothing should be done about it
• Consensus view from the rest of the literature 
points to a “ramping up” of policy and more of a 
mix of adaptation and abatement than Stern
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